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14.1 On Some Uses and Limitations ofForecast Data
How and how well economists forecast, and how much their predictions
help or hurt public and private decision making, are matters that ought to
receive much attention from the profession. This is so not only because of
their direct interest to the authors, users, and critics ofthe forecasts, but also
because oftheir intrinsic but less evident academic interest. What is the prac-
tical applicability ofeconomic analysis in this critical area? What is the qual-
ity of foresight and counsel that can be expected of responsible economists?
These are broad questions which are not easy to answer, but they are basic
and surely deserve to be tackled. This requires that we systematically con-
front forecasts as indications of how economists ex ante thought events were
likely to unfold with ex post knowledge of what actually did happen and
how. The aims, from the least to the most ambitious, are (1) to measure fore-
cast errors, (2) to explain them, and (3) to learn how to reduce them in the
future.
Success in forecasting may be occasional and fortuitous or intuitive, but
progress in forecasting, to the extent it is possible, can only come from ad-
vances ofscience, not art or chance. It presupposes that sufficiently important
and persistent regularities in economic processes and relationships exist and
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are properly identified and used. Learning processes are involved, which can
be time-consuming and discontinuous, reflecting in part the shifts and discon-
tinuities in the economic change itself, in part the inadequacies of measure-
ment and analysis.
Data on economic forecasts generally cover short time periods. Long time
series of consistent predictions simply do not exist. Few if any forecast sets
are fully identified according to the many aspects and dimensions that matter
(source, target, timing, assumptions, data, models, and methods used), so
that it is often difficult to determine what constitutes a suitable "sample" of
forecasts of a given type. Moreover, few forecasters leave their models and
techniques unchanged for long as they seek improvements and try to adapt to
new developments in the economy. Hence, a particularforecaster's past record
is often a highly uncertain basis for inferences about future performance.
Even more hazardous, ifnot irresponsible, are attempts to grade forecasters
on the evidence ofhow well they predicted change in a particular short period,
say, a year or a few years. Clearly, on any single occasion some forecasters
will be ahead of others by sheer chance or for some idiosyncratic reasons.
Strong evidence of significant and stable differences over time is required to
rank the forecasting individuals, groups, or models with a modicum ofconfi-
dence, and such evidence is essentially lacking (Zarnowitz 1967, 1971; Christ
1975; McNees 1975).
The proliferation in recent years of multiperiod quarterly macroforecasts
offers no substitute for long historical series. These are rich data containing
much interesting material that certainly deserves to be carefully recorded and
analyzed. However, such forecasts, and their errors, tend to be internally cor-
related in at least two ways: (1) serially, within each sequence made from a
given base period, and (2) across the successive sequences, which overlap and
thus refer partially to the same target period. Each multiperiod forecast is a
joint product ofthe common information, technique, and judgment used, and
each depends on previous forecasts of which it is to some extent a revision.
Thus, errors in the data, models, procedures, and judgments, autocorrelated
disturbances, and certain types of distributed lags are all likely to induce in-
terdependencies within and between the multiperiod forecasts. The resulting
complex correlation structures resist estimation, given the small samples of
comparable predictions from any given source. Consequently, measures of
average accuracy, bias, etc., calculated from such samples are difficult to in-
terpret from the viewpoint of statistical inference (Spivey and Wrobleski
1978).
Two conclusions are surely valid. First, small-sample studies of forecasts
are still needed and can be instructive, but their limitations must be recog-
nized. Second, it is necessary to compile and examine forecast records ex-
tending as far back in time as possible, so as to gain information, take a longer
view offorecasting behavior and performance, and place the short records of
recent predictions in a proper perspective. Historical data on post-World War416 Chapter Fourteen
II forecasts assembled in the 1960s by the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search (NBER) provide a good base here, which I was able to partially extend
and update. Some preliminary results for annual forecasts of three variables
are reported below.
14.2 The Record ofAnnual GNP Forecasts since 1947
In the early post-World War II period, most forecasts were made near the
end ofthe calendar year for the next year and most referred to GNP in current
dollars. The evidence we have on such forecasts goes back to 1947 but is quite
fragmentary for the late 1940s and early 1950s.
The period oftransition from the war economy witnessed the largest errors
on record in the GNP forecasts. Even after the 1945-46 predictions were
shown to have greatly underestimated the then-prevailing levels of economic
activity (L. R. Klein 1946), expectations ofa business slump stubbornly per-
sisted. One small, reputable group ofprivate forecasters came up with an av-
erage prediction for 1947 ofa 6% decline in GNP, whereas the actual change
turned out to be a rise ofabout 11%. For 1948 the group predicted a fractional
decline, but GNP instead advanced again at much the same surprisingly high
rate. The failure of forecasts during these years was widespread, with but a
few partial exceptions; the developments ofthe time could not have been pre-
dicted well with estimates based on data and relationships for the 1930s and
false analogies with the early post-World War I period, and were not. When a
recession finally came late in 1948, it proved shorter than many had expected.
A "consensus forecast" by more than 30 respondents polled in December
1948 anticipated well the decline of nearly 2% in GNP during 1949, but a
year later the same group was wide ofthe mark in predicting a drop of3:5%,
whereas GNP actually staged a strong comeback in 1950 with a rise exceeding
10% (though it should be noted that the latter resulted in part from the onset
ofthe Korean War in June 1950).
The evidence for the period 1953-76 is summarized in table 14.1 in terms
of comparisons between the predicted and the actual annual percentage
changes. It is generally instructive to analyze forecast errors in terms of lev-
els, absolute changes, and percentage changes, but if a choice must be made
for succinctness, there are several good reasons for using percentage changes
where technically appropriate, particularly for variables with strong trends.
(1) What is predicted in the first place is change from the last known or esti-
mated level, and percentage changes often depend less on the levels and are
more stable and comparable over time than dollar changes. (2) Percentage
change forecasts are apt to be less affected by data revisions. (3) Some impor-
tant measures ofpredictive performance, such as correlations with actual val-
ues, are much more meaningful for change forecasts than for level forecasts.
(4) It is the rates of growth in economic aggregates (income, output, prices)
that are ofmain interest to analysts and policymakers.417 Annual and Multiperiod Quarterly Aggregate Forecasts
The forecasts are made late in the year t - lor, in a few cases, very early in
the target year t; typically, the forecasters know the official estimates for the
first three quarters but not for the last quarter of the year t - 1. The actual
changes used to compute the errors are based on the first official estimates for
the year t published early in the following year (t + 1). These are provisional
values which are themselves partly near-term predictions, and subsequent re-
visions indicate that the errors in the early data are by no means negligible
(cols. 10-11).1 On the average, without regard to sign, these revisions are
about one-third the size ofthe forecast errors (lines 5-8). The errors are com-
puted by subtracting the actual from the predicted (or estimated) changes, and
they are predominantly negative, which shows that both forecasts and the pro-
visional figures strongly tend to understate the changes in GNP (lines 9-12).
By far most of these underestimated changes are increases (for a review of
similar findings ofearlier studies, see Zamowitz 1972b).
Table 14.1 discloses a substantial correspondence between the forecasts
and the realizations. The predicted changes approximate the actual ones well
in each period covered, the averages ofthe former being generally less than 1
percentage point smaller than the averages ofthe latter (lines 1-4). Where the
mean actual changes increased (as from 5% per year in 1956-63 to 8% per
year in 1963-76), so did the mean predicted changes; moreover, the discrep-
ancies between the two diminished in the latter years. The forecasts are in all
cases considerably more accurate than the naive model which assumes that
next year's percentage change will be the same as that of the previous year
and more accurate than the-somewhat less naive-trend extrapolation
model, which projects the average percentage change ofthe 4 previous years.
Collectively, the mean absolute error (MAE) offorecasts is less than half that
of the first naive model (lines 5-8, col. 8), and the ratio of the two declines
from 0.47 in 1956-63 to 0.43 in 1963-76 and 0.34 in 1969-76. The corre-
sponding ratios for comparisons ofthe forecasts with the 4-year moving aver-
age ("trend") extrapolations (col. 9) are 0.84, 0.56, and 0.44.
The average error measures are important, but they fall far short of telling
the whole story. Measures ofcorrelation (which unfortunately are often omit-
ted from forecast evaluations) are needed to show how well the predicted
changes have tracked the actual changes over time. The ,2 coefficients for the
forecasts covered in table 14.1 are all positive and significant, generally ex-
ceeding .5 and, for the more recent periods, averaging .7 or higher (lines 13-
1. In some evaluations, forecasts are adjusted for the differences between the forecaster's own
estimates ofthe base (current actual value) and the revised base figures (see McNees 1975, pp. 7-
9, and Eckstein 1978, p. 320, for arguments in favor ofthat practice). My own view is that it is
more instructive to study the base revisions separately as one of the sources contributing to the
total error, that is, to compute and compare both the level errors unadjusted and the absolute
change errors adjusted for base revisions. For percentage change errors, which to save space are
alone used here, I agree with McNees (1975, p. 9) that "it is not clear what adjustments for data
revisions would be appropriate oreven possible." Preliminary calculations indicate that the effects
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16, cols. 1-7). In contrast, the corresponding coefficients for the extrapola-
tions (cols. 8 and 9) are zero or near zero (where larger, r is negative). These
results mean that the extrapolations can account for little or none ofthe varia-
tion in year-to-year changes in GNP, while the forecasts have captured most
ofthis variation.
Because sufficiently long and consistent annual time-series data for GNP
are not available, no attempt was made here to test the forecasts against higher
standards provided by more effective extrapolation methods such as the auto-
regressive integrated moving-average (ARIMA) models. However, recent
comparisons ofquarterly forecasts with such models show the forecasts to be
on the average more accurate (Hirsch, Grimm, and Narasimham 1974; Christ
1975; Spivey and Wrobleski 1978), and I would expect this to be a fortiori
true for the annual forecasts and particularly with respect to the correlations
with the actual values.
The evidence supports the conclusion that the end-of-year forecasts of
current-dollar GNP next year had a reasonably satisfactory record ofaccuracy
since 1953. Indeed, in comparisons with earlier forecasts (Sapir 1949; Okun
1959; Zarnowitz 1967), that record improved considerably in the 1960s and
even in the 1970s, a turbulent period presumed to have been particularly dif-
ficult to forecast.
It must be noted that our collection is certainly no random sample, includ-
ing as it does the official administration forecasts and several ofthe most rep-
utable and influential sets of private predictions by business and academic
economists (see notes to table 14.1). It is also true that our data and measures
have some shortcomings that must not be overlooked. In particular, the esti-
mates of the current position (ECP) which the forecaster actually used as the
starting point or base are not always reported. In some cases, therefore, the
base values had to be imputed, which was done using data as of the (precise
or approximated) date of the forecast plus such information as was available
on how the forecaster derived his ECPs on other occasions. The imputations,
even though carefully made, undoubtedly contain some errors. However,
these errors are definitely not such as to invalidate the broad conclusions of
this paper. 2
It is difficult to draw more detailed inferences concerning the relative accu-
racy of the different forecast sets covered from these results. One reason is
that the forecasts differ appreciably with regard to their precise dates, and it is
known from previous research that later predictions have a significant advan-
tage over earlier ones (Zamowitz 1967; McNees 1975). It is apparent, how-
ever, that the average error and correlation measures do not show large, con-
sistent differences among these forecast sets. This is in agreement with earlier
2. Other possible errors, also not critical, might arise from the fact that some ofour forecasts,
lacking directly reported annual predictions, are averages of forecasts for shorter periods within
the coming year. This could cause some deviations from the span or target Period intended by the
forecasters (Carlson 1977).421 Annual and Multiperiod Quarterly Aggregate Forecasts
findings which together strongly suggest that the search for a consistently su-
perior forecaster is about as promising as the search for the philosophers'
stone (Zamowitz 1971; McNees 1973,1975, 1976; Christ 1975).
A few further observations seem warranted. Although the forecasters in-
cluded differ in many respects, even a detailed inspection reveals few sharp
contrasts between their predictions for the same years. Ofcourse, competent
forecasters use common data and techniques, regularly interact, and are often
similarly influenced by recent events and current attitudes and ways ofthink-
ing. The genuine ex ante forecasts here considered are all to a large extent
"judgmental." Large doses ofjudgment enter, mostly helpfully, the forecasts
derived with the aid ofeconometric models (see, e.g., Haitovsky, Treyz, and
Su 1974). This could well tend to reduce the dispersion among the corre-
sponding predictions ofthis type; there is indeed some evidence that errors of
ex ante forecasts with econometric models vary less than errors of ex post
forecasts made without judgmental adjustments (Christ 1975). At the same
time, many so-called judgmental forecasters also use some more or less ex-
plicit econometric equations or models, "outside" or "own" (Zamowitz 1971;
Su and Su 1975). While published forecasts by ranking practitioners are often
developed with particular skill and care, group average forecasts greatly ben-
efit over time from cancellations of individual errors of opposite sign (Zar-
nowitz 1967, 1972b). At any given time, the deviations between correspond-
ing forecasts from different sources are likely to be reduced by the working of
these balancing factors. Thus, it is not surprising that forecasts for the same
variable and target period tend to be similar. Indeed, the correlations between
pairs ofthe forecast sets included in table 14.1, computed for the four periods
distinguished therein, are significantly higher than the correlations between
predictions and realizations recorded on lines 13-16. The r2 coefficients for
eight pairs of the predicted percentage change series all exceed .8, and some
are considerably higher.
Ofthe 110 observations in our seven forecast sets, about 64% are underes-
timates ofchange and 34% are overestimates. By far most ofthe latter refer to
years marked by economic recessions (1954, 1960, 1970, 1974) or slow-
downs (1962, 1967). The provisional GNP values show but two year-to-year
declines in the period covered in table 14.1: in 1954, which the forecasts over-
stated, and in 1958, which the forecasts missed (accounting for the only
tuming-point errors in this sample). Thus underestimation was limited to the
increases in GNP; moreover, it was most pronounced when the increases were
particularly large, as in 1953, 1955-56, 1965-66, 1968-69, and 1973.
These results suggest the presence of "systematic" errors, but not in the
sense of a bias that could have been readily escaped or corrected in advance.
It seems difficult to discount them as merely another manifestation of the fa-
miliar tendency of forecasts to underestimate the observed changes (which,
for series with random elements, is a property ofeven unbiased and efficient
forecasts [Mincer and Zamowitz 1969; Hatanaka 1975]). What is underesti-422 Chapter Fourteen
mated here is the average annual rate ofgrowth in a series which, as properly
recognized by the forecasters, is trend dominated and seldom declines from
year to year. This outcome can be traced to the forecasters' tardy recognition
ofhigh-growth phases ("booms") and, increasingly, ofinflation speedups, but
it was also mitigated by their even tardier recognition of business recessions
and slowdowns. Such movements are recurrent and not purely random; they
have important, detectable regularities as shown by historical studies ofbusi-
ness cycles; but they are also nonperiodic and indeed vary a great deal over
time, so their predictability remains very limited. In any event, simple "learn-
ing from past errors" would not have been of much use here as the errors of
these forecasts generally have zero or very low autocorrelations.
14.3 Annual Forecasts ofReal GNP and the Price Level
It is difficult to obtain and verify consistent forecasts of GNP in constant
dollars and the implicit price deflator (IPD) that would cover more than just
the most recent period. Few business forecasters in the 1950s and 1960s made
systematic efforts to decompose their predictions of current-dollar GNP into
quantity and price elements. Ofthe forecasters with econometric models, who
paid more attention to real GNP, only two (the University of Michigan and
Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates) have longer records. 3
Table 14.2 shows that the predicted changes in real GNP, taken without
regard to sign, differed from the actual changes by less than 1percentage point
on the average (lines 1-3). The predicted changes tend to be smaller than the
actual ones, except for the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) forecasts
(col. 3), where the reverse obtains. The MAEs ofthe forecasts average a little
over four tenths ofthose ofthe simple last-change extrapolations in 1959-67
and 1962-76, about one third in 1969-76 (lines 4-6, col. 6). Comparisons
with extrapolations of the average percentage change of the 4 previous years
give very similar results, except for 1959-67, where the forecast errors aver-
age about two thirds ofthe extrapolation errors (lines 4-6, col. 7).
Correlations between the predicted and actual changes are all significantly
positive, and they too suggest some improvement in recent years: the r2 coef-
ficients for 1969-76 are higher than those for the earlier and longer periods
(lines 10-12). It is interesting to observe that all but one of them exceed the
corresponding coefficients for current-dollar GNP forecasts, particularly so
for the predictions with the Wharton models and the ASA-NBER group me-
dians (from quarterly surveys regularly conducted by the American Statistical
Association and evaluated by the National Bureau of Economic Research)
3. Some of the econometric forecasts were released at more than one date near the end ofthe
year, and in more than one version depending on the data used orpolicy assumptions made. In all
but a few doubtful instances where somewhat arbitrary decisions had to be made, the forecasts
chosen are those preferred by the forecaster or, lacking stated preferences, those which embodied

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(compare table 14.2, line 12, and table 14.1, line 16). In contrast to the rea-
sonably high correlations for the forecasts proper, those for the extrapolations
(cols. 6-7) are here again extremely low or negative.
These summary measures, then, present the annual forecasts of real GNP
in a generally favorable light. However, the accuracy ofthese forecasts varied
greatly in different years, which at times seriously impaired their usefulness,
and this does not show up in the summary. As suggested by the averages with
regard to sign (lines 7-9), the usual tendency of forecasts to underestimate
changes prevailed in the first half ofthe period 1959-76 but not in the second
half. Actually, the errors varied considerably in each subperiod, primarily re-
flecting cyclical change and in particular the disturbing effects of missed
downturns. Real GNP turned down in 1954,1958,1970, and 1974, but ofthe
10 predictions for these years which are available, 8 specified continued rises
and only 2 succeeded in signaling declines. Again, and not surprisingly,
nearly all of the significantly large overestimation errors refer to the years
during which national output grew at relatively low or decreasing rates, and
most ofthe larger underestimation errors refer to the years ofhigh real-growth
rates.
It is of considerable interest to note that the turning-point errors are much
larger than other errors (on the average about 2V2-3 times larger, for all fore-
casts in this collection). Thus, even though relatively few, these directional
errors had a strong adverse impact on the overall accuracy of the real GNP

















This evidence contradicts the argument that turning-point errors matter
little because they are few and far between (see, e.g., Samuelson 1976). But
the argument goes further to say that such few large errors are the necessary
(and small) price to pay for the avoidance ofmany large errors "between turn-
ing points" by means of optimal estimation procedures such as least squares.
However, it is not clear that these procedures imply more than that the vari-
ance ofthe predicted changes must be less than that ofthe actual changes (and
progressively declining as the forecast span is lengthened). It has never been
demonstrated that a trade-off between errors at major turning points and other
errors exists, and it would seem a counsel of despair for the forecasters to
accept it as inevitable. Prediction ofcyclical turns in such series as real GNP,
though certainly difficult, is not necessarily impossible, particularly on an an-
nual basis (note the good record in forecasting troughs). In sum, there are
indeed strong reasons for makers and users of economic forecasts to give a425 Annual and Multiperiod Quarterly Aggregate Forecasts
great deal of attention to turning-point errors. Actually, most of them realize
this, as is shown by the acknowledged need for and practice ofanalyzing such
errors (Hickman 1972; Adams and Duggal 1974; Fromm and Klein 1976).
However, there is certainly much need for improvement here, and room for
some new initiatives (e.g., on how to use current signals from leading indica-
tors, see Vaccara and Zarnowitz 1978).4
The worst single year for the predictions covered in table 14.2 was 1974,
on the eve of which forecasters across the field missed the onset of a serious
recession. This and the smaller turning-point errors for 1970 are the main
reasons for the rise in the average errors of these forecasts in 1969-76 com-
pared with the earlier years. But the rise in the absolute errors was not large,
and it is well to recall that at the same time there was some improvement in
accuracy as measured by the criteria of comparisons with extrapolations and
correlations of predicted with actual changes (compare lines 4-6 and 7-12,
cols. 3-4 and 6-7, in table 14.2). Limited evidence from one longer series of
forecasts suggests that real GNP was predicted with similar average errors in
the two 8-year periods, 1953-60 and 1969-76, with much smaller errors in
the relatively quiet years 1961-68.
Although the forecasts ofreal GNP are about as good relative to our simple
extrapolative benchmark models as are the forecasts of GNP in current dol-
lars, they are less accurate in terms of comparisons of the errors with the
actual percentage changes to be predicted. The point is that the extrapolations
perform substantially better for nominal GNP than for real GNP. This can be
shown by dividing the error ofextrapolation into'the size ofthe actual change,
without regard to sign, which gives the following overall ratios for the Xl (last
change) and X2 (average change) models:
GNP-Xl, 0.44; X2, 0.30. Real GNP-Xl, 0.78; X2, 0.68.
These results accord with expectations, since the growth rates in constant-
dollar GNP varied considerably more than those in current-dollar GNP. The
ratios offorecast error to extrapolation error average about 0.4 when Xl is the
standard, 0.5-0.6 when X2 is, and the results are much the same for either
variable.
Table 14.3 surveys the performance of forecasts of percentage changes in
the price level (IPD) that match the real GNP predictions covered in table
14.2. On the average, the predicted inflation rates fall short ofthe actual ones
by fractions of 1 percentage point (lines 1-3). The 1959-67 forecast sets are
less accurate than simple last-change extrapolations (line 4), and the other sets
4. Eckstein (1978, p. 321) expresses doubt on this score, saying that "for example, leading
indicators began to fall in August 1974...." But this applies only to the indicators in current
dollars; the present leading index based largely on series in constant dollars or physical units
turned down in June 1973,5 months before the date ofthe NBER reference peak, and kept falling.
Similarly, nominal GNP declined only slightly for a single quarter in 1975, quarter 1 (hereafter
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.427 Annual and Multiperiod Quarterly Aggregate Forecasts
outperform the naive models by relatively small margins, much less than
those observed for the GNP series. The naive models work comparatively well
here, with errors averaging about three tenths of the actual changes in IPD.
Projections of the last change are in this case better than those of the average
change (cols. 6-7), which is the reverse ofthe situation for GNP in both cur-
rent and constant dollars. The forecasts underestimated strongly (much more
than the last-change extrapolations) the average inflation since 1961 (lines 7-
9). The predicted and actual percentage changes in the price level are all pos-
itively correlated, but the correlations for 1969-76 are generally lower than
their counterparts for GNP and, still more so, for real GNP (lines 10-12).
Forecasts of inflation often have much in common with projections of the
last observed rate ofinflation. To illustrate, correlations between the errors of
these forecasts and the errors ofthe corresponding extrapolations produce the
following r2 coefficients: Michigan (1959-76), .51; CEA (1962-76), .78;
ASA-NBER (1969-76), .95; Wharton (1969-76), .80. For growth rates in
real GNP, the correlations between forecast errors and extrapolation errors are
also positive but throughout lower, in most cases much lower. These results
are not surprising, and they have a positive aspect inasmuch as forecasts
should be closer to extrapolations of a given type in those cases where such
extrapolations are more effective (for an elaboration, see Mincer and Zarnow-
itz 1969). However, our comparisons are constrained to naive models which
presumably do not represent high standards for economic forecasting. In par-
ticular, price-level forecasts that are highly correlated with last-change extrap-
olations must share the property of the latter to lag a year behind the actual
rates of inflation. Indeed, the correlations between the predicted changes and
the previous year's actual changes are all positive and high: the r2 coefficients
for the four sets of IPD forecasts listed earlier in this paragraph are.76, .87,
.81, and.72, respectively. These are far higher than the r 2 between successive
actual changes, which range from .17 to .54 depending on the period (col. 6).
The annual percentage changes in real GNP (RGNP) are inversely related
to those in IPD and positively related to those in current-dollar GNP, while
the last two variables do not show a strong or stable association. The relation-
ships between the predicted changes generally parallel the actual ones. This is
illustrated by the r2 coefficients tabulated below.
1962-76 1969-76
Actual Michigan CEA Actual Michigan CEA
RGNP-IPD .567(-) .328(-) .528(-) .646(-) .472(-) .651(-)
RGNP-GNP .297 .210 .222 .644 .464 .491
IPD-GNP .020 .217 .068 .085(-) .004 .022(-)
The errors of the forecasts are similarly interrelated. Table 14.4 demon-
strates a pervasive pattern of negative correlation between errors in forecast-428 Chapter Fourteen
Table 14.4 Correlations between Errors ofForecasts ofPercentage Changes in
Nominal GNP, Real GNP, and IPD, 1962-76
Squared Correlation (r2)
between Forecasts Errors
ForRGNP ForRGNP For IPD
and IPD and GNP and GNP
Line Source ofForecast (1) (2) (3)
1962-76 (15 years):
1 Economic Report (CEA) .297(-) .359 .114
2 Michigan model .494(-) .429 .006
1969-76 (8 years):
3 Economic Report (CEA) .677(-) .004 .259
4 Michigan model .684( -:-) .209 .014
5 Wharton model .340(-) .036 .466
6 ASA-NBER survey, median .525(-) .013 .351
Note: The sign (-) following the r2 coefficient indicates that r is negative.
ing real growth and inflation (col. 1). The tendency for these errors to be
offsetting, which benefits the forecasts of GNP in current dollars, is most
strongly in evidence for the more recent years. When forecasters overesti-
mated real growth, or missed a downturn and projected continued growth
instead, they typically also underestimated inflation, as in 1969-71 and 1973-
74. Underprediction of real growth occurred in 1972 and 1975-76 in combi-
nation with overprediction ofinflation.
These observations, which have some precedents (Moore 1969a, 1977a,
Zamowitz 1969b), are consistent with a view of the world in which nominal
GNP changes are predicted directly and relatively well, but their division into
real and price changes continues to pose great problems. Many forecasters
may agree with that view in general terms, and some subscribe to models
consistent with it (a specific example might be the St. Louis model, in which
the dollar change in total GNP expenditure is determined mainly by the dollar
change in a measure of money stock). However, most macroeconometric
models, including the two sets covered here, have separate aggregate-real-
demand, output, and price-level equations, and it is not at all clear why they
should predict GNP better in current than in constant dollars. In fact, some
studies of the recent performance of quarterly models arrive at the opposite
conclusion, namely, that the results for real GNP are better than those for
nominal GNP because of deficient price forecasts (Duggal et al. 1974; Eck-
stein, Green, and Sinai 1974). The available evidence seems too limited and
too mixed to permit any conclusive generalizations on this point. But it is
interesting to observe that the importance ofoutput errors versus price errors
may vary with changes in the relative roles ofreal versus nominal factors and
disturbances: in the 1970s the errors of the GNP forecasts were for the most429 Annual and Multiperiod Quarterly Aggregate Forecasts
part better correlated with the IPD errors than with the RGNP errors, whereas
in the 1960s the contrary situation obtained (table 14.4, cols. 2-3).
14.4 Quarterly Multiperiod Forecasts, 1970-75: An Overall Appraisal
Here the forecasts and actual data refer to overlapping sequences of quar-
ters, not simply to a series of successive years. Our materials cover 22 quar-
ters from 1970:3 through 1975:4, a period for which forecasts from several
new sources are available. First estimates for the preceding year, taken from
the data prior to the 1976 benchmark revision ofthe national income accounts,
serve as comparable realizations. Comparisons with the revised data will re-
quire a fully integrated treatment of forecast errors and measurement errors.
In short, we now deal with much more complex forecasts but basically treat
the predictions and actual data in the same straightforward fashion as before.
Four of the sources use formal macroeconometric models combined with
judgmental adjustments and (often several alternative) assumptions about ex-
ogenous factors. These include, in alphabetical order: Bureau of Economic
Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce (BEA); Chase Econometric
Associates, Inc. (Chase); Data Resources, Inc. (DRI); and Wharton Econo-
metric Forecasting Associates, Inc. (Wharton). Each ofthese forecasters pre-
dicts more than 100 variables each quarter, for sequences of up to 8 quarters
ahead, so each can be said to produce regular and relatively detailed forecasts
ofthe short-term course ofthe U.S. economy. However, the models used dif-
fer in several important respects, such as size and selection ofthe exogenous
variables. Thus, the BEA model is currently viewed as of"medium" scale (it
has 98 equations, of which 58 are stochastic); Chase is "large" (it has 150
equations, of which 125 are stochastic); so is Wharton (which has 201 equa-
tions, of which 67 are stochastic); and DRI is "very large" indeed (with 718
equations, 379 ofwhich are behavioral). 5
Forecasts by a group associated with the General Electric Company (GE)
use individual econometric relationships in an iterative process involving a
large amount ofjudgmental prediction; they are not based on a formal model
of simultaneous equations. This system also is large enough to produce fore-
casts ofover 100 variables. In addition, the ASA-NBER median forecasts are
included as a benchmark set of composite predictions. The surveys attract a
representative cross section of professional forecasters, mainly business but
also academic and government economists. The number of participants var-
ies, averaging about 50 per survey. Their methods and techniques differ, but
informal use ofmodels and judgment prevails. The averages ofthe individual
5. See Intriligator 1978, table 12.12, pp. 454-56, for the numbers of equations and other
summary characteristics ofthe models. Fromm and Klein (1976, table 1, p. 2) define the scale of
a model, based on the number of equations, as follows: very small = 9 or less, small = 10-49,
medium = 50-119, large = 120-99, very large = 200 or more.430 Chapter Fourteen
predictions from the surveys trace well the trends in what is sometimes called
the "standard" or "consensus" forecast.
As shown in table 14.5, lines 1-6, the MAEs ofGNP forecasts are close to
1 percentage point (like the annual forecasts, see table 14.1) for 2 quarters
ahead and about half of that or less for 1 quarter ahead. Over longer spans,
the MAEs rise more or less steadily by increments varying generally from 0.2
to 0.5 of 1 percentage point for each additional quarter. The MAEs approach
2 percentage points for 4-quarter spans and exceed it for 5-quarter spans; sim-
ilarly, they approach 3 percentage points for 7-quarter spans and exceed it for
8-quarter spans. Consistent with earlier findings and interpretations for vari-
ous types ofmultiperiod forecasts (see, e.g., Zamowitz 1967, pp. 60-72), the
MAEs increase somewhat less than in proportion to the extension ofthe span.
The errors in forecasts ofpercentage changes expressed on a per-unit-of-time
basis (roughly, MAE divided by the length ofthe effective span) are substan-
tially stable, neither rising nor declining systematically as the forecast reaches
further into the future. The same applies to the errors of the implicit predic-
tions ofchanges during the successive single quarters covered; it is the cumu-
lation of these intraforecast ("marginal") change errors that technically ac-
counts for the tendency of errors in the total predicted changes to grow with
the span. 6
Where both forecasts and realizations refer to increases (as they do most of
the time by far in the case of GNP), errors of positive sign denote overesti-
mation and errors of negative sign denote underestimation of actual change.
For the short spans of 1-4 quarters, the mean errors (ME) are in all but one
instance positive for BEA, Chase, and DRI, while they are, on the contrary,
negative throughout for ASA-NBER, GE, and Wharton (table 14.5, lines 7-
12). In absolute terms, these averages are predominantly small, however (less
than 10.21 except for the ASA-NBER errors, which are larger). For the longer
spans of 5-8 quarters, the MEs are generally negative, much larger abso-
lutely, and rising with the span. As will be shown below, the overall MEs
conceal large errors ofopposite sign in the forecasts for some ofthe different
economic phases ofthe period 1970-75.
The ,2 coefficients for the correlations between the predicted and actual
changes in GNP exceed .6 or .7 for I-quarter ahead (like the annual forecasts)
and exceed .4 or .5 for 2 quarters ahead (lines 13-18). They are generally
much smaller for the longer spans, mostly in the .1-.3 range, in a few cases
(interestingly, for the middle, rather than the longest, spans) near zero.
Theil's inequality coefficients are remarkably similar for the different fore-
cast sources and horizons, falling mostly between 0.2 and 0.3 (lines 19-24).
This indicates that these forecasts are all much better than a naive model ex-
6. Note that fewer observations are available for the longer spans (table 14.5, n. b). This re-
duces the comparability ofthe measures reported for the different spans but does not eliminate it
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Table 14.5 Summary Measures ofError for Quarterly Multiperiod Predictions of
Percentage Change in GNP, 1970-75
Span ofForecast in Quartersb
Forecast One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight
Line Seta (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean Absolute Error, in Percentage Points
1 ASA-NBER .51 1.03 1.44 1.67 2.10
2 BEA .46 .84 1.36 1.67 2.27
3 Chase .42 1.03 1.32 1.68 2.22 2.73 3.19 3.49
4 DRI .53 1.04 1.43 1.94 2.43 2.69 2.95 2.80
5 GE .42 .95 1.34 1.71 2.19 2.59 2.88 3.25
6 Wharton .40 .98 1.60 1.68 1.92 2.35 2.83 3.07
Mean Error, in Percentage Pointsd
7 ASA-NBER .06 -.27 -.38 -.39 -.91
8 BEA .05 .11 .10 .11 -.22
9 Chase .01 .04 .02 .08 -.14 -.66 -1.48 -2.34
10 DRI -.01 .11 .05 .11 .01 -.42 -1.12 -1.69
11 GE -.14 -.15 -.30 -.15 -.15 -.44 -.95 -1.68
12 Wharton - .12 - .10 -.19 -.12 -.15 -.69 -1.32 -2.17
Squared correlation (r2) between Predicted andActual Changes
13 ASA-NBER .612 .615 .262 .168 .384
14 BEA .704 .597 .201 .032 .007
15 Chase .752 .451 .107 .058 .127 .134 .179 .293
16 DRI .632 .469 .069 .()()()e .008 .102 .249 .600
17 GE .753 .577 .284 .159 .132 .180 .227 .225
18 Wharton .773 .453 .099 1.148 .252 .349 .310 .440
Theil's Inequality Coefficient (U)
19 ASA-NBER 287 .270 .266 .242 .210
20 BEA .250 .256 .271 .266 .251
21 Chase .241 .287 .294 .268 .236 .218 .198 .189
22 DRI .284 .292 .299 .295 .272 .218 .182 .148
23 GE .245 .260 .260 .243 .233 .204 .181 .172
24 Wharton .223 .291 .306 .249 .215 .186 .183 .171
aSee text on the sources and abbreviations used.
bNumber offorecasts covered per set: ASA-NBER, BEA; 22,21,20, 19, and 17 for spans 1-5, respec-
tively; Chase, DRI, GE, Wharton; 22, 21, 20, 19, 18, 17, and 16 for spans 1-7, respectively; 15 (Chase,
Wharton), 14 (DRI), and 12 (GE) for span 8.
cMAE = lInlle,l, where e, = P, - A" P, = predicted percentage change, A, = actual percentage
change, and n = number offorecasts covered (for the given set, variable, period, and span).
lIME = lInle, (see n. c).
er is negative.
IV = YLe:lLA; (see n. c).432 Chapter Fourteen
trapolating the last-recorded percentage change (for which U = 1). That
model, it should be noted, is but a minimal standard for economic forecasts.
It is worth noting that the U coefficients do not increase with the forecast span;
in fact, they decline slightly below .2 for the longest spans.
The next two tables have the same format as table 14.5, which facilitates
presentation and comparisons of these measures. Real GNP have MAEs (in
percentage points) rising from .5-.6 for 1quarter ahead to 5-6 for 8 quarters
ahead, that is, somewhat more than in proportion to the measured span (table
14.6, lines 1-6). The errors for the two shortest spans are not much larger
than those for GNP in current dollars, but the errors for the longest spans are
50%-100% larger. The unusually rapid buildup ofthe MAEs can be traced in
large part to turning-point errors. In quarterly multiperiod forecasting, turning
points are more frequent and more difficult to predict than in annual forecast-
ing, but the errors associated with them matter much more yet. Here, missing
a tum often means that a whole chain ofpredictions for the subsequent obser-
vations is badly off.
The MEs of these forecasts are all positive, which is largely due to the
effects of missing or underestimating the declines in real GNP during the
recession (table 14.6, lines 7-12). The MEs also cumulate continuously and
rapidly here, quite unlike those for the nominal GNP forecasts.
Relative to the size of the actual percentage changes, the real GNP errors
are on the average much larger than the current-dollar GNP errors. Note that
the inequality coefficients in table 14.6, lines 19-24, rise from .4 or more for
the shortest to .7 or more for the longest forecasts. (In contrast, let us re-
call, the corresponding statistics in table 14.5 vary in the vicinity of .2 for all
spans.)
In terms ofcorrelations with the actual changes, on the other hand, the real
GNP forecasts look favorable. The ,2 coefficients are throughout rather sur-
prisingly high in table 14.6, averaging over .8 for 1quarter ahead, over.7 for
2, 5, and 6 quarters ahead, and over .6 for the other spans (lines 13-18). They
are much higher than the ,2 coefficients for GNP in table 14.5, particularly for
the longer forecasts.
The MAEs offorecasts ofinflation in terms ofthe GNP IPD are once more
ofthe order of .5 or less 1 quarter ahead, approximately 1 percentage point 2
quarters ahead (table 14.7, lines 1-6). However, they cumulate very rapidly,
especially in the range of the longer forecasts. The figures for the 4-quarter-
ahead predictions are here on the average about 5 times as large and the figures
for 8 quarters ahead are more than 13 times as large as those for the I-quarter
span.
This exceptionally strong, much more than proportional buildup of errors
reflects a progression of underestimates of inflation rates. The MEs in table
14.7 are all negative (lines 7-12) and average about - .2, -1.5, and -5.5
percentage points for the spans of 1, 4, and 8 quarters, respectively.
The ,2 coefficients for the IPD inflation forecasts are generally higher than433 Annual and Multiperiod Quarterly Aggregate Forecasts
Table 14.6 Summary Measures ofError for Quarterly Multiperiod Predictions of
Percentage Change in Real GNP, 1970-75
Span of Forecast in Quartersb
Forecast One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight
Line Seta (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean Absolute Error, in Percentage Points
C
1 ASA-NBER .56 1.24 1.89 2.43 3.09
2 BEA .56 1.37 2.14 2.80 3.17
3 Chase .51 1.11 1.81 2.46 3.29 4.19 4.95 5.31
4 DRI .61 1.37 2.08 2.75 3.52 4.15 4.78 5.58
5 GE .50 1.20 1.75 2.15 2.80 3.80 4.76 5.15
6 Wharton .45 1.18 1.73 2.00 2.48 3.18 4.24 4.92
Mean Error, in Percentage Pointsd
7 ASA-NBER .10 .32 .76 1.30 1.71
8 BEA .32 .68 1.12 1.71 1.83
9 Chase .17 .51 .92 1.46 1.98 2.38 2.63 2.82
10 DRI .26 .77 1.20 1.82 2.59 3.16 3.66 4.72
11 GE .00 .22 .36 .95 1.53 2.09 2.46 2.58
12 Wharton .02 .35 .72 1.22 1.71 2.17 2.69 2.90
Squared Correlation (r2) between Predicted andActual Change
13 ASA-NBER .846 .789 .698 .684 .746
14 BEA .829 .754 .642 .512 .508
15 Chase .839 .817 .727 .703 .733 .710 .604 .596
16 DRI .793 .745 .598 .584 .785 .827 .741 .638
17 GE .808 .741 .677 .661 .772 .764 .661 .662
18 Wharton .820 .672 .651 .745 .816 .781 .730 .580
Theil's Inequality Coefficient (U)e
19 ASA-NBER .461 .532 .618 .663 .660
20 BEA .476 .585 .675 .756 .701
21 Chase .433 .502 .607 .673 .711 .741 .758 .741
22 DRI .504 .622 .721 .769 .781 .774 .774 .836
23 GE .427 .498 .548 .606 .627 .676 .714 .694
24 Wharton .398 .543 .582 .563 .555 .584 .632 .662
aSee text on the sources and abbreviations used.
bNumber of forecasts covered per set: ASA-NBER, BEA: 22, 21, 20, 19, and 17 for span 1-5, respec-
tively; Chase, DRI, GE, Wharton: 22, 21, 20,19,18, 17 and 16 for spans 1-7, respectively; 15 (Chase,
Wharton), 14 (DRI), and 12 (GE) for span 8.
cMAE = lInIle,l, where e, = P, - A" P, = predicted percentage change. A, = actual percentage
change, and n = number offorecasts covered (for the given set, variable, period, and span).
tiME = lInIe" (see n. c).
eU = V~e~/~A~ (see n. c).
those for the forecasts ofpercentage change in nominal GNP (except for a few
short predictions) but throughout lower than the corresponding statistics for
the real-growth forecasts. They range from .23 to .71 and tend to decrease as
the spans lengthen (table 14.7, lines 13-18).
The inequality coefficients U average .31 for the shortest and .48 for the434 Chapter Fourteen
Table 14.7 Summary Measures ofError for Quarterly Multiperiod Predictions of
Percentage Change in the Price Level, 1970-75
Span of Forecast, in Quartersb
Forecast One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Eight
Line Seta (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean Absolute Error, in Percentage Points
C
1 ASA-NBER .45 1.02 1.64 2.26 3.14
2 BEA .44 1.10 1.86 2.55 2.96
3 Chase .39 1.02 1.64 2.29 2.98 3.87 4.88 5.69
4 DRI .54 1.11 1.69 2.37 3.05 4.04 5.17 6.78
5 GE .39 .90 1.49 1.96 2.37 3.06 4.08 4.79
6 Wharton .35 .79 1.38 1.95 2.76 3.57 4.54 5.53
Mean Error, in Percentage Pointsd
7 ASA-NBER - .26 -.64 -1.20 -1.82 -2.77
8 BEA -.24 -.57 -1.07 -1.70 -2.18
9 Chase -.15 -.49 -.96 -1.50 -2.33 -3.31 -4.42 -5.48
10 DRI -.27 -.70 -1.22 -1.85 -2.82 -3.88 -5.12 -6.78
11 GE -.12 - .36 -.70 -1.20 -1.85 -2.78 -3.76 -4.57
12 Wharton -.14 -.46 -.96 -1.44 -2.02 -3.08 -4.29 -5.34
Squared Correlation (r2) between Predicted andActual Change
13 ASA-NBER .651 .587 .474 .410 .385
14 BEA .574 .388 .309 .217 .210
15 Chase .600 .440 .394 .287 .246 .233 .320 .381
16 DRI .478 .426 .412 .346 .401 .398 .384 .371
17 GE .657 .633 .508 .440 .438 .457 .524 .676
18 Wharton .714 .711 .652 .566 .502 .495 .494 .396
Theil's Inequality Coefficient U)e
19 ASA-NBER .325 .341 .382 .408 .458
20 BEA .338 .382 .410 .445 .446
21 Chase .311 .358 .377 .410 .438 .462 .480 .496
22 DRI .375 .388 .397 .422 .444 .475 .508 .540
23 GE .284 .286 .326 .354 .369 .395 .416 .410
24 Wharton .265 .270 .307 .339 .365 .399 .436 .465
aSee text on the sources and abbreviations used.
bNumber of forecasts covered per set: ASA-NBER, BEA: 22, 21, 20, 19, and 17 for spans 1-5, respec-
tively; Chase, DRI, GE, Wharton: 22, 21, 20,19,18,17, and 16 for spans 1-7, respectively; 15 (Chase,
Wharton), 14 (DRI), and 12 (GE) for span 8.
cMAE = lInIletl, where et = Pt - At' Pt = predicted percentage change, At = actual percentage
change, and n = number offorecasts covered (for the given set, variable, period, and span).
a'ME = l/nIet (see n. c).
eU = VLe;/~A; (see n. c).
longest inflation forecasts, displaying a systematic but gradual increase with
the span (lines 19-24). They are higher than their counterparts for the current-
dollar GNP forecasts but lower than those for the real GNP forecasts.
A critical point revealed by the comparison of our tabulations is that the
quantity and price ingredients of the GNP forecasts show a pattern of offset-435 Annual and Multiperiod Quarterly Aggregate Forecasts
ting errors in the quarterly as well as annual data. The MEs of real-growth
predictions are all positive; those of inflation predictions, all negative.
Matched by source and span, these statistics have similar absolute values for
most ofthe shorter forecasts. As a result, the MEs ofthe current-dollar GNP
forecasts for spans 1-4 vary in sign but are generally small. For the longer
spans 5-8, however, the negative MEs ofthe inflation forecasts outweigh the
positive MEs of the real-growth forecasts, often by large margins. Conse-
quently, the MEs of the longer forecasts of percentage changes in GNP are
almost without exception negative (denoting underestimation) and for the
most part relatively large.
Forecasts from the different sources are comparable only in a limited and
qualified sense. Not only do the models vary in scale and choice ofexogenous
variables (and practically nothing can be done to allow for these differences),
but there are also some systematic discrepancies in the timing of the predic-
tions. The GE forecasts are typically made early in the quarter. 7 Late forecasts
are often somewhat more accurate than those released earlier, since they enjoy
advantages of additional and more current information.8 Some ofthe sources
produce forecasts 2 or even 3 times a quarter, but so far we have been able to
obtain only one set ofpredictions for each ofthem; with more information, it
will be possible to increase the number ofsets which are more nearly compa-
rable in terms ofthe release dates.9
Despite the many difficulties that beset them, comparisons between fore-
casts are needed and will inevitably be made. Some summary statements on
the apparent relative accuracy ofthe forecasts are therefore in order here, but
they must be interpreted with great caution and cannot support any strong
conclusions. According to the MAEs, Wharton and GE forecasts ofboth real
growth and inflation rank high (i.e., they have relatively low MAEs), but as
already noted, these sets, particularly GE, have the advantage of late timing.
Among the four "early-quarter" forecasters, Chase and ASA have better rec-
ords than BEA and DRI for most of the 1-5-quarter forecasts of percentage
changes in real GNP and IPD, but BEA ranks overall higher than the others
for the corresponding nominal GNP predictions. Ofthe four, only Chase and
DRI predict over longer (6-8-quarter) spans, and here DRI has somewhat
lower errors for the growth rates in nominal and real GNP, and Chase has
somewhat lower errors for inflation.
The differences between the MAEs across sources are mostly small; their
precise significance is unknown but probably in many cases low. Other mea-
7. For the release dates, see McNees 1975, p. 39; 1976, p. 41.
8. For evidence, see Zamowitz 1967, pp. 126-30 and McNees 1975, pp. 22-30; 1976, pp.
31 ff.
g. Three of the sources predict more than once each quarter, and the calendar of the releases
suggests the following classification for them (EQ, MQ, and LQ denote early-quarter, mid-
quarter, and late-quarter forecasts, respectively):
Chase: EQ, LQ DRI: EQ, MQ, LQ Wharton: EQ, MQ436 Chapter Fourteen
sures of forecasting performance such as the correlations between predicted
and actual changes often yield different rankings of the forecast sets. I con-
clude that the surveyed measures do not show any of the forecasters to be
consistently and generally superior to others. This result is consistent with
other evaluations which find that the rankings of forecasters vary depending
on the variables, periods, and spans covered as well as on the criteria and
measurements applied. 10
14.5 Quarterly Multiperiod Forecasts: An Analysis by Subperiods
The period 1970:3-1975:4, although short, was unusually varied and
marked by major disturbances and drastic changes in the economy's course. It
is useful to divide it into the following parts, as suggested by the contempo-
rary business cycle and inflationary developments: (1) 1970:3-1973:1: End
ofthe mild 1970 recession followed by an expansion that accelerated in 1972,
with relatively stable inflation. (2) 1973:1-1973:4: Slower real growth and a
sharp inflation speedup (materials shortages, runups in commodity prices, oil
embargo). (3) 1973:4-1975:1: Recession, severe in its last 2 quarters, accom-
panied first by a further rise and then by a downturn in the rate of inflation.
(4) 1975:1-1975:4: Sharp upturn and the initial recovery phase, with a further
decline in inflation.
One question is whether forecasts that originated in these four subperiods
show significantly different characteristics and performance. The other is
whether forecasts for these subperiods (i.e., those that aimed at the corre-
sponding groups of target quarters) are so differentiated. It turns out that the
answers to both questions are definitely yes.
To illustrate the first point, the expansion phase 1 produced forecasts that
underestimated growth in dollar GNP mainly because they underestimated
inflation. The percentage changes in real GNP were partly underpredicted,
partly (in some longer forecasts) overpredicted, but whether negative or posi-
tive the MEs ofthese forecasts were small. In general, the record ofthe fore-
casts that were made during period 1 was good in terms of both the ME and
the MAE figures, even for the long spans. In contrast, the slowdown phase 2
produced real-growth predictions with very large positive MEs and inflation
forecasts with very large negative MEs (underestimation errors). These errors
balanced each other so that the MEs for the nominal GNP predictions were
moderate (and mostly negative, except for the longest forecasts). The reces-
10. The findings ofthis study should and will be carefully compared with those ofotherapprais-
als of the same forecasts, but the task is still to be completed. Differences between the error
measures used are difficult to allow for and they becloud the results of such comparisons. None-
theless, it is interesting to observe that the 1975 and 1976 studies by McNees report rankings of
forecasting performance for GNP, real GNP, and IPD that resemble rather well the results ofthe
present evaluation. (McNees also shows that the forecasters often score quite differently for other
variables.)437 Annual and Multiperiod Quarterly Aggregate Forecasts
sion phase 3 gave rise to even larger positive MEs in the real-growth forecasts
as the declines were repeatedly missed and, when finally recognized, under-
estimated. These errors were larger absolutely than the negative errors on the
price side, which reflected a continuing underestimation of inflation, so that
the predictions of the growth rates in nominal GNP had consistently positive
MEs in subperiod 3.
The above summary is based on charts (not reproduced here) which show
the average errors (MAE and ME) by span and by subperiod in which the
forecasts originated. 11 These charts look very similar for the different models.
They show in each case the same striking differences between the forecasts
made in subperiods 1, 2, and 3. The suggested inference is that concurrent
predictions from different sources and models have common patterns such that
their errors depend strongly and similarly on the characteristics ofthe time of
their origin.
In a second exercise, the forecasts were assigned to the four subperiods
according to their target quarters, not their base quarters, as illustrated in fig-
ures 14.1-14.3. Here the samples are partitioned differently; hence the result-
ing patterns diverge from those obtained on the first plan, but the conclusion
is analogous. The type and size of forecast errors depend critically on the
economic properties of the target periods vis-a-vis those of the periods of
origin. Forecasters perform best when the two periods are alike, belonging to
the same already recognized phase-for example, a continuing expansion as
in 1971-72 (most of subperiod 1). They perform worst when the target falls
into a new phase, particularly when the latter departs sharply from the cur-
rently established pattern (forecasts made in subperiods 2 and 3 and those for
subperiods 3 and 4 provide many examples, particularly in the long-span cat-
egories). Such period characteristics are much more important determinants
offorecast errors than are any differences among the forecasters.
Figure 14.1 shows that all six forecasters persistently underestimated the
percentage changes in GNP for subperiods 1 and, much more strongly, 2. All
of them overestimated GNP changes in their short forecasts for subperiod 3
(from 1 to 3 or 4 quarters ahead) and underestimated changes in the longer
forecasts for the same phase. Overestimates prevailed in all sets for the last
phase covered, subperiod 4. As would be expected, MAEs typically increase
with the span in any phase, and so do MEs when taken without regard to sign.
In subperiod 4, however, the average errors behave in an unusual fashion, first
increasing and then decreasing with the lengthening span (the rises refer to
spans 1-5; the declines to spans 6-8). This is due to offsets between the real-
growth forecasts with positive MEs and the inflation forecasts with negative
MEs (see figs. 14.2 and 14.3).
Overall, figure 14.1 demonstrates for the GNP forecasts that the average
11. No averages for phase 4 are used on this basis, since they contain too few observations in
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Fig. 14.3 Quarterly multiperiod forecasts ofpercentage changes in the IPD,
average errors by subperiod and span, two models, 1970-75
Note: For key, see fig. 14.1.
error patterns by subperiod and span are substantially similar across the differ-
ent sources covered. As will be seen below, much the same statement applies
to the MAE and ME patterns for the real GNP and IPD forecasts.
Figure 14.2, which covers the real-growth forecasts, shows underestimates
dominating the relatively moderate errors for the expansion and slowdown
phases 1 and 2. The errors for the recession phase 3 and, particularly, for the
1975 recovery phase 4 are much larger, and they cumulate far more rapidly
over the longer spans. The MEs for the two latter subperiods are positive and,
for the long forecasts, as large as the MAEs ornearly so. Here the huge errors
derive mainly from the forecasters' failure to predict the declines in real GNP
and, to a lesser extent, from underestimation of the declines that were pre-
dicted. 12 The buildup oferrors tapers off at the long end ofthe forecast range
12. The change errors, Pt- At (see table 14.5 for the definitions), are positive where Pt>O and
At>O and also where Pt < 0 and At < 0 but Iptl < IAJ These cases dominate in fig. 14.2 the
results for both the recession phase 3 and the recovery phase 4. Although real GNP reached a
trough in 1975:1and increased thereafter, the actual changes over longer spans ending in 1975 are
negative: that is, real GNP was lower during period 4 than in 1973 (period 2) and during most of
1974 (period 3).442 Chapter Fourteen
in subperiod 3, but it is strikingly fast throughout in subperiod 4, where the
MAEs and MEs increase tenfold or more between the I-quarter span and the
8-quarter span.
Figure 14.3 shows that the inflation forecasts had relatively small errors in
subperiod 1 and considerably larger and on the average all negative errors in
subperiod 2; in neither phase did the errors increase strongly with the span.
In contrast, the recession period 3 witnessed very large inflation errors, dom-
inated throughout by underestimates and cumulating rapidly. The short fore-
casts for the initial recovery phase 4 had small errors, mostly with positive
means, indicating overestimation of inflation rates that just began to decline.
The long forecasts for this last subperiod, however, show very large underes-
timation errors.
A close examination offigures 14.1-14.3 discloses certain appreciable dif-
ferences between the forecasters' performances with respect to the particular
variables, subperiods, and spans covered. For example, DRI has smaller er-
rors than Chase in predicting real growth 5-8 quarters ahead for phases 1 and
2, but larger errors than Chase in the corresponding forecasts for phases 3 and
4; in predicting growth over the short range of 1-4 quarters, Chase is on bal-
ance ahead of DRI. The average accuracy record of inflation forecasts favors
GE over Wharton for phase 1 and Wharton over GE for phase 4; for 2 and 3,
the picture is mixed, with Wharton scoring as well as GE, or a little better, in
the short range but worse than GE in the long range. However, all ofthese are
matters ofdetail, and the differences are typically small. The main lesson from
the comparisons of the MAE and ME patterns is that the similarities greatly
outweigh the differences between the forecasters' performance records.
14.6 Concluding Observations
The end-of-year forecasts ofannual percentage changes in GNP earn good
marks for overall accuracy when judged according to realistic, rather than
ideal, standards. Moreover, they are found to have improved in the period
since the early 1960s compared with the previous years after World War II.
The corresponding forecasts for GNP in constant dollars (real growth) and
IPD (inflation) are weaker. The former suffer from large turning-point errors;
the latter from large underestimation errors. But the errors in forecasts ofreal
growth are negatively correlated with the errors in forecasts of inflation,
which helped to make the nominal GNP predictions more accurate. In recent
times, these correlations were connected with the unexpected concurrence of
accelerating inflation and slowing, then declining output rates. Optimistically,
and probably also from a lingering faith in a simple Phillips trade-off, fore-
casters kept anticipating less inflation and more growth. But in the late 1950s
and early 1960s, it was the relative stability of the price level that caused
widespread surprises, and offsetting errors resulted from the opposite combi-
nation ofoverestimates ofinflation and underestimates ofreal growth.443 Annual and Multiperiod Quarterly Aggregate Forecasts
Forecasts of inflation are not much better than projections of the most re-
cently observed inflation rates, and they lag behind the actual rates much like
such projections. The deficiency of price-level forecasts, documented in this
and other studies, surely impairs the general ability ofeconomists to analyze
the prospects for the economy. Improvements will require major advances in
our knowledge, presumably through research based on carefully worked out
data (abstract speculation abounds, but good information and observation are
rare in this area).
The favorable record of annual GNP predictions does not imply that fore-
casters can perform well the more difficult task of predicting quarterly
changes in GNP within the year ahead or even beyond it. Forecasts for the
year as a whole can be satisfactory when based on a good record for the first 2
quarters; they tend to be more accurate than forecasts with longer spans. 13 An
examination of the recent multiperiod predictions shows that the errors for
real GNP and IPD cumulated rapidly beyond the spans of2-4 quarters. Pre-
vious studies have shown the cumulation to be as a rule less than proportional
to the increase in the span, but in this period the buildup oferrors was much
greater than usual. No doubt in less turbulent times the longer forecasts can
be considerably more accurate, but this fair-weather argument is not very per-
suasive or helpful. At the present time, the predictive value of detailed fore-
casts reaching out further than a few quarters ahead must be rather heavily
discounted. Again, what is critical here is theoretical analysis and empirical
research that would lead to improvements in our ability to predict broad move-
ments in the price level and business cycle turning points. Despite setbacks,
there is still no reason to give up moderate hopes for an ultimate advance on
these fronts.
13. Also, errors ofpredictions for the individual parts ofthe year at times offset each other to
some degree (Zamowitz 1967; McNees 1973, 1974). These gains from aggregation over time
resemble those from aggregation over sectors (GNP is predicted with smaller average errors of
relative change than are most of its components; see Zamowitz 1967, 1972b; Fromm and Klein
1976).